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Study Finds TV Opt‑Out Settings Fail on Some Brands

Researchers at Northeastern University examined whether the “opt‑out” setting for automatic content recognition (ACR) on smart televisions actually stops the devices from sending viewing data to manufacturers. The study, which monitored twelve televisions from ten different makers, concluded that the setting works for most platforms but fails on several popular brands, leaving consumers’ viewing habits exposed.

How ACR Works and What the Study Tested

ACR technology samples audio or video that is playing on a TV, creates a digital fingerprint, and forwards that fingerprint to a remote database. Companies use the resulting data to generate program recommendations, compile viewership metrics, and serve targeted advertising. The Northeastern team wanted to discover when ACR was active on each device, whether opting out altered the behavior, and what type of content (audio, video, or both) was being captured.

To answer these questions, the researchers built an automated testing suite using their Mon(IoT)r software and the SPHERE Research Infrastructure. The suite captured every network packet sent from each television, allowing the team to infer ACR activity based on the destination addresses and traffic patterns.

The twelve televisions evaluated were:

  • Samsung QN32Q60DAF – Tizen OS
  • LG TV 32LR655BPUA – webOS
  • Roku TV 32R3B5 – Roku OS
  • TCL TV 32S350R – Roku OS
  • Sony K-43S20M2 – Google TV OS
  • Vizio VHD32M-0810 – Vizio OS
  • Fire TV HD32N200A – Fire OS
  • Supersonic SC-1520VTV – Vidaa OS
  • Westinghouse WX24HX2800 – Xumo OS
  • Hisense 32A4K – Google TV OS (no ACR)
  • TCL 32S250G – Google TV OS (no ACR)
  • Sony KD32W830K – Google TV OS (no ACR)

Each TV was fed content from a range of sources: first‑party streaming apps such as LG Channels and The Roku Channel, third‑party services like Netflix and YouTube, HDMI input, over‑the‑air broadcast, and screen‑mirroring. The researchers also varied the media type—full video with audio, audio‑only with a black screen, and video‑only without sound—to determine whether the devices relied on audio or video fingerprinting.

Key Findings on ACR Activity and Opt‑Out Effectiveness

Several devices showed no ACR traffic at all. The Westinghouse Xumo TV and three models running Google TV OS (a Sony, a Hisense and a TCL) did not generate any recognizable ACR‑related network packets during the tests. Conversely, all televisions that did transmit ACR‑linked data scanned over‑the‑air broadcasts, and every platform except Google TV and Amazon’s Fire OS also applied ACR to first‑party streaming apps.

Third‑party streaming services such as Netflix and YouTube were largely exempt from ACR monitoring, with the exception of a small amount of traffic on LG’s webOS that disappeared once the opt‑out setting was enabled. Screen‑mirroring appeared safe on all platforms except those running Vidaa OS, where monitoring persisted.

When the team isolated audio‑only and video‑only content, distinct fingerprinting patterns emerged. Samsung’s Tizen OS seemed to rely on video fingerprinting, LG’s webOS and Supersonic’s Vidaa OS on audio, while Fire OS, Google TV OS, Roku OS and Vizio OS employed a combination of both audio and video signals.

Opt‑out performance varied by operating system:

  • WebOS, Fire OS, Vidaa OS and Sony’s Google TV OS stopped sending ACR‑related traffic after the user selected the opt‑out.
  • Samsung’s Tizen OS reduced but did not eliminate ACR traffic; packets continued when using the antenna, first‑party streaming apps and HDMI input.
  • Both Roku‑based TVs (the TCL and the Roku brand) kept transmitting ACR data for the Roku Channel app even after opting out. TCL’s menu explicitly notes this limitation; Roku’s does not.
  • Vizio’s TV showed no change in ACR‑linked traffic after opting out, a finding the company later addressed in a public statement.

Because most of the traffic to suspected ACR endpoints was encrypted, the researchers could not definitively confirm the content of the remaining packets. They described the continued flow as “suspicious” but acknowledged the inability to verify whether the data was still ACR‑related or served other operational purposes.

Vizio Response, Vidaa Vulnerability, and Recommendations

Following the publication of the study, Vizio spokesperson Mischa Dunton emailed that the encrypted traffic observed was not ACR data but routine operational information such as diagnostics and performance metrics, as outlined in Vizio’s privacy notices.

The study also uncovered a security flaw in Vidaa OS. The vulnerability allowed the researchers to intercept an unencrypted MQTT broker that connects Vidaa‑based TVs to Unruly, a video‑ad platform. Each intercepted message contained a permanent client identifier, time zone, app name, input source, antenna channel and an audio fingerprint. Over a three‑hour window the team collected data from more than one million unique televisions. Vidaa confirmed the issue and mitigated it by requiring authentication for the server, though the messages remain unencrypted.

Based on the findings, the researchers offered several practical steps for consumers. The most straightforward protection is to disconnect the TV from the internet entirely and rely on an external streaming device that does not run ACR. For users who prefer built‑in apps, the study suggests choosing platforms that respected opt‑out settings—namely webOS, Fire OS, Sony’s Google TV OS and Vidaa OS—while ensuring all available privacy toggles are enabled.

They also provided a blocklist of known ACR endpoints that can be filtered with network‑level tools such as Pi‑hole, noting that the blocklist does not degrade picture quality or overall TV functionality.

Finally, the authors called on manufacturers to increase transparency by listing every input source that ACR monitors in privacy policies, to encrypt all ACR traffic, and to authenticate communications. They urged regulators to enforce robust opt‑out mechanisms so that consumer preferences are fully honored.

The study highlights a fragmented privacy landscape for smart televisions. While many brands have implemented effective opt‑out controls, the persistence of data transmission on Samsung, Roku and Vizio devices shows that consumers cannot assume that disabling a setting guarantees privacy. Ongoing scrutiny by researchers and clearer regulatory guidance appear essential to protect viewers from undisclosed data collection.

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