A six‑member probe team has released preliminary findings that point to a possible failure of the main braking system on the Kolkata‑Sairang Express, which derailed at Digaru railway station in Assam on November 11. According to the report, a brake pipe angle cock – a valve that regulates the flow of compressed air needed to apply brakes throughout the train – was found in the isolated (closed) position on the locomotive. The investigators suggest that this isolation could have prevented the brakes from functioning when the crew attempted to stop the train, leading to the overshoot of a red signal and the subsequent derailment.
Sequence of events leading to the accident
On the morning of November 11, the Kolkata‑Sairang Express departed Guwahati with its crew – the loco pilot, assistant loco pilot and guard – reporting that the braking system was operating normally when they took charge at around 5:30 a.m. The train proceeded to Panbari station, where at 6:16 a.m. the wheels of one coach began to overheat because brake pads had become jammed. The crew halted the train, attended to the overheating wheels and kept the train stationary for roughly thirty minutes.
After the issue was addressed, the train resumed its journey at 6:46 a.m. As it approached Digaru station, the station master instructed the train to enter a loop line and stop to allow another train to pass. When the crew applied the brakes, the system allegedly failed to respond. The train continued past the red signal, struck a dead‑end track, and derailed.
Technical findings on the brake system
The joint note prepared by the investigation team on the day of the accident highlights the role of the brake pipe (BP) angle cock. The angle cock controls the passage of compressed air that activates the pneumatic brakes on each coach. The note records that the BP angle cock was discovered in an isolated condition on the locomotive, meaning the air line was closed. If the angle cock remained closed, the pneumatic brakes would not have received the pressure needed to engage, even though the crew physically applied the brake lever.
According to the same note, the train crew did indeed attempt to apply the brakes, but the isolated angle cock could have rendered the effort ineffective. The preliminary findings do not attribute responsibility for the isolation of the brake system, nor do they confirm whether the crew verified the brake functionality before the train left Panbari station.
Expert commentary and unanswered questions
Safety experts cited in the report suggest that the crew may have been relying on the train’s alternative regenerative braking system to control speed during the journey. Regenerative brakes convert kinetic energy back into electrical energy and can supplement, but not wholly replace, the primary pneumatic brakes. When the train approached the loop line at Digaru, the crew likely attempted to engage the main brakes, only to discover they were non‑functional.
One expert raised the question of who had isolated the main braking system. The possibility that railway staff closed the angle cock while addressing the jammed brake pads at Panbari – and then failed to reopen it before departure – is mentioned in advisories issued by several railway divisions after the accident. However, this explanation remains unconfirmed, and the expert noted that the sequence of events makes the involvement of an outsider unlikely.
The report also emphasizes that the preliminary findings do not establish whether the crew checked the brake system’s status before resuming travel from Panbari. Statements from the loco pilot, assistant loco pilot and guard uniformly assert that the braking system was functional when they assumed control of the train at Guwahati. No definitive conclusion has yet been drawn about whether a procedural lapse or a mechanical oversight caused the angle cock to remain closed.
Authorities have called for a thorough investigation to determine the exact cause of the brake failure and to identify any lapses in standard operating procedures. The investigation will need to examine maintenance records, crew checklists, and any communications related to the brake‑pad jam at Panbari.
In the meantime, the incident underscores the critical importance of verifying the status of safety‑critical components such as brake pipe angle cocks before a train resumes motion after any maintenance activity. The railway’s safety protocols typically require a systematic check of the pneumatic brake circuit to ensure that all valves are correctly positioned and that air pressure is present throughout the train. Any deviation from these checks can have severe consequences, as illustrated by the Digaru derailment.
The Kolkata‑Sairang Express derailment adds to a series of recent railway incidents that have prompted renewed scrutiny of braking systems and maintenance practices across India’s rail network. While the final report is pending, the preliminary indication that a closed brake valve may have been a key factor serves as a reminder of the delicate interplay between mechanical components and operational discipline in ensuring passenger safety.






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